Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2018

A Private Law Court in a Public Law System
Jamal Greene
Columbia Law School, jgreen5@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Jamal Greene, A Private Law Court in a Public Law System, 12 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 37 (2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3221

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

Law & Ethics of Human Rights 2018; 12(1): 37–72

Jamal Greene*

A Private Law Court in A Public Law System
https://doi.org/10.1515/lehr-2018-0005

Abstract: The U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to human rights is a global outlier.
In conceiving of rights adjudication in categorical terms rather than embracing
proportionality analysis, the Court limits its ability to make the kinds of qualitative judgments about rights application required to adjudicate claims of disparate impact, social and economic rights, and horizontal effects, among others.
This approach, derivative of a private-law model of dispute resolution, sits in
tension with the rights claims typical of a pluralistic jurisdiction with a mature
rights culture, in which litigants more often disagree, reasonably, about the
scope of rights rather than deny that others have them at all. In order to overcome the mismatch between the nature of the rights claims the Court faces and
its anachronistic technology of adjudication, it will need not only to adopt a
form of proportionality analysis but it will also need to adjust the ways in which
it receives and assesses empirical social facts and it will need to broaden its
remedial toolkit to include, for example, suspensions of invalidity. While proportionality is far from perfect, its flaws are anticipated by the challenges of
constitutional democracy itself under conditions of pluralism.
Keywords: proportionality, rights, social facts, remedies, supreme court, constitutional court

Introduction
It is at best premature, and at worst, simply wrong to speak of an emerging
global consensus on the scope and content of rights. Even if we were to place on
one side autocratic states, theocracies, and states with single-party rule or weak
mechanisms of political accountability, the United States would remain as a
rather large elephant in a rather small room. The United States Supreme Court
does not recognize social and economic rights,1 horizontal effects or positive

1 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
*Corresponding author: Jamal Greene, Professor, Columbia Law School, New York, NY, USA,
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state duties,2 or group rights,3 and in many instances, it rejects the very idea of
context sensitivity in adjudicating disputes between conflicting rights holders or
between rights and the public good.4 To varying degrees, this posture places the
Supreme Court out of step with the constitutional and apex courts of Europe and
Canada, among others.
Many explanations have been offered for the Supreme Court’s resistance to
harmonizing its rights jurisprudence with that of other Western democracies.
Perhaps the Court’s putative devotion to “originalism,” or at least the gravitational pull of constitutional history, hampers any effort to understand rights in
progressive terms or to look to foreign courts for guidance.5 Perhaps the failure
of the U.S. Constitution to enumerate textually the power and scope of judicial
review has led the Court constantly to question the legitimacy of its political
interventions and therefore to resist a jurisprudence that requires it to conduct
balancing as a matter of course.6 Perhaps the institution of life tenure, a global
anomaly, fosters a fatal disconnect between federal judges and contemporary
problems and values.7
Without necessarily rejecting these explanations, this article explores three
broad ways in which the Supreme Court’s institutional practices imperil its entry
into the global rights discourse. First, it is well-trodden ground in the comparative
constitutional law literature that the Court is one of the few prominent apex or
constitutional courts that lacks any trans-substantive commitment to proportionality analysis, preferring instead to understand rights in bespoke, categorical
terms.8 The Court’s approach results from an historical path dependence rather
than any considered judgment. While it is not necessary for the Court to adopt any
particular version of proportionality analysis, the Supreme Court must soften its
commitment to categorical adjudication—as it has already done, but sub rosa and
ad hoc—if it is to engage transparently with modern rights conflicts.

2 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
3 See Regents of the University of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
4 See, e. g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443
(2011).
5 See Antonin Scalia, Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, Keynote Address at the
Ninety-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 98 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 305 (2004).
6 See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094,
3122–23 (2015).
7 See Vicki C. Jackson, Congressional Standing and the Institutional Framework of Article III: A
Comparative Perspective, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1783, 1800 (2016).
8 See MOSHE COHEN-ELIYA & IDDO PORAT, PROPORTIONALITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE
(2013); Jackson, supra note 6.
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Second, the Court was designed primarily to handle common law diversity
suits between private litigants, and many of its procedures assume, implicitly,
that these remain the Court’s paradigm cases. But modern public law litigation is
different in numerous respects. Most significantly, the Court’s answers to the
questions presented are of great interest not just to the litigants but to similarly
situated individuals, public officials, lower courts, and concerned citizens
throughout the country. Moreover, the answers political actors have offered to
those questions reflect competing constitutional judgments rather than simply
the pursuit of private interests. We also should not assume that in the mine run
of constitutional rights controversies, the litigants who reach the court have
better access to relevant information or greater incentive to develop the factual
record than do various third parties. This assumption is particularly unlikely to
hold in cases that turn on legislative or social rather than judicial or historical
facts.9
Accordingly, if the Court is to remain in the business of public law adjudication, and to do so honestly, it must develop mechanisms for receiving factual
information more effectively. These mechanisms might include relaxing or eliminating constraints on third-party standing; permitting third parties otherwise to
intervene more fluidly at either the trial or appellate stages; openly altering the
standard of review of trial court findings of legislative fact; lengthening the
argument stage before the Supreme Court in order to permit more transparent
evaluation of outside evidence; or appointing a special master or creating a
judicial research service to conduct relevant empirical research.
Finally, the public law character of the Court’s rights docket means that
remedies that narrowly grant a single plaintiff’s requested relief toggle between
being wholly inadequate to vindicate the right at issue and creating serious
problems of public administration. Concerns about the Court’s remedial competence put negative pressure on the recognition of rights in the first instance.10
The basic problem is that modern rights adjudication inevitably conflicts with
legitimate acts of self-governance; the government’s obligation to respect a
positive right, for example, does not ipso facto entail that the government may
not act in ways that prevent the right’s full realization. Within such a regime,
remedial orders must be sensitive both to the individual’s right and to the
polity’s first-order entitlement to govern itself.

9 See Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61
DUKE L.J. 1 (2011).
10 See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857
(1999).
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There are numerous ways of fashioning remedial orders to be more responsive to democratic concerns. At the broadest level, the literature has identified
what has been alternatively called weak-form judicial review or, in Stephen
Gardbaum’s parlance, the “new commonwealth” model.11 Models of this sort
assign to the legislature a formal role in responding to the constitutional
pronouncements of the apex or constitutional court. A more pragmatic alternative for the U.S. Supreme Court that requires no legislative or constitutional
intervention would be to incorporate particular elements of the weak-form
model or other instrumentalities of political dialogue into the Court’s remedial
toolkit. For example, the mechanism of suspending the invalidity of unconstitutional laws, used in the Canadian, German, and South African high courts
(among others), is often a better fit for modern rights adjudication than the
Supreme Court’s typically all-or-nothing approach to case disposition. A more
radical—and also more problematic—reform would be a limited abstract questions jurisprudence, which could prevent the need for drastic remedial orders in
advance.
The U.S. Supreme Court cannot sensibly resolve modern rights conflicts
without recognizing the deep sense in which it is, in practical terms, a constitutional court. Its procedures do not accord with the Kelsenian model: It is an apex
court within a decentralized system, its jurisdiction is activated only by a litigant
with standing to raise an actual case or controversy, and its pronouncements
notionally bind the litigants alone. But the presence of these features does not
prevent a sober assessment of broadly compatible institutional choices that are
prevalent among the world’s constitutional courts. This article is a call for
reform.
A point of clarification is necessary before proceeding to the merits. This
article is not, in its essence, a substantive defense of proportionality, inquisitorial adjudication, or remedial flexibility. The essential claim is not that proportionality is the best all-things-considered method for resolving conflicts over
rights. That proposition would require a lengthier defense than this article
attempts. Rather, the claim is that proportionality and its attendant additional
institutional fit the rights environment of a mature constitutional democracy. It
is in the nature of such a democracy that rights are respected in general terms
but that their specification prompts reasonable disagreement. Proportionality’s
warts—and it has many—are but the warts of modern judicial review.

11 See Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2781 (2003);
STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY AND
PRACTICE (2012).
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I A Life Cycle of Rights
The Court’s canonical 1973 decision in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez well illustrates the problem.12 Parents of students in the Edgewood
Independent School District in San Antonio brought a class action lawsuit
against various state officials challenging the state’s system of financing public
education. Because of Edgewood’s relatively low property tax base, its primary
and secondary public schools had a much lower level of per pupil expenditure
than the schools in wealthier areas of San Antonio.13 The plaintiffs brought a
challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
alleging that wealth discrimination in this context was unconstitutional.
The Court rejected the challenge in a 5-to-4 decision. Understanding the
Court’s reasoning in the case requires some background on the categorical
nature of U.S. rights jurisprudence, an orientation that was in relative infancy
in 1973 but has since blossomed into blackletter U.S. constitutional law. The
default standard of constitutional review for ordinary legislation, whether at the
local, state, or federal level, is rational basis review. Under this deferential
standard, a law is upheld by a reviewing court if it bears a rational relationship
to a legitimate state purpose. A government act is removed from this default
category only if the plaintiff can demonstrate that special conditions apply:
either the plaintiff has been deprived of a fundamental right or the plaintiff
has been subjected to discrimination based on a categorically protected ground,
prominently including race, gender, or national origin. By design, these categories are modular and discrete rather than fluid and continuous.
The Rodriguez Court, adopting this categorical approach, atomistically
divided its equal protection clause analysis into a series of steps. First, is the
plaintiff part of a “suspect” class, i. e., one that is subject to discrimination along
a protected ground? Writing for the majority, Justice Powell refused to place the
plaintiffs into a category of indigent persons (which some of them likely were
not) or relatively poor persons (which he rejected on evidentiary grounds), and
he argued that categorizing them as residents of relatively poor school districts
could not support the application of a heightened standard of review because it
constituted a “large, diverse, and amorphous class.”14
The other way Justice Powell believed the plaintiffs could escape rational
basis review would be to argue successfully that they were deprived of a
fundamental right. The Court refused to declare a right to education
12 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
13 See id., at 11–14.
14 Id., at 28.
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fundamental. The plaintiffs had argued that, much in the way a right to privacy
was held to be fundamental 8 years earlier in Griswold v. Connecticut because of
the nexus between privacy and various enumerated constitutional rights,15 there
was a strong connection between education and values of political participation
that animate the First Amendment. Justice Powell worried openly about the
slippery slope towards which that theory would lead the Court:
[T]he logical limitations on appellees’ nexus theory are difficult to perceive. How, for
instance, is education to be distinguished from the significant personal interests in the
basics of decent food and shelter? Empirical examination might well buttress an assumption that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among the most ineffective participants
in the political process, and that they derive the least enjoyment from the benefits of the
First Amendment.16

For the Court, individual, case-by-case assessments of the importance of particular interests affected by state action would “be assuming a legislative role,
and one for which the Court lacks both authority and competence.”17 The Court
said further that, even assuming a fundamental right to some level of education,
a heightened standard of review was inappropriate in the absence of a total
deprivation.18
Finally, having precluded heightened scrutiny, the Court rejected the claim
that Texas’s school financing system was arbitrary and irrational, reasoning that
it was one rational way to vindicate the State’s legitimate interest in local control
over public education.19 Justice Powell again relied on a “slippery slope” argument, writing:
[I]f local taxation for local expenditures were an unconstitutional method of providing for
education, then it might be an equally impermissible means of providing other necessary
services customarily financed largely from local property taxes, including local police and
fire protection, public health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of various kinds.
We perceive no justification for such a severe denigration of local property taxation and
control as would follow from appellees’ contentions.20

The Court argued, in other words, that accepting the plaintiffs’ claims would
commit it to accepting other, hypothetical claims that would interfere with other
domains of civil society.

15 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
16 411 U.S. at 37.
17 Id., at 31.
18 See id., at 36–37.
19 See id., at 42.
20 Id., at 54.

Private Law Court in A Public Law System

43

The San Antonio case models the American style of rights adjudication in
several ways. First, as noted, it is categorical. Justice Thurgood Marshall suggested in his Rodriguez dissent that the Court should jointly account for the
relative importance of education and the relative arbitrariness of district wealth
discrimination rather than require each ground for heightened scrutiny to clear
an independent hurdle.21 Justice Potter Stewart, concurring in Rodriguez,
described this view, which would fit comfortably into much of the global rights
discourse, as “imaginative.”22 The notional analytic structure of American constitutional cases relies upon an ex ante assessment of whether the claimant
belongs to a category of presumptive rights holders. That assessment motivates
the ex post determination of whether the government has behaved
appropriately.
Second, the American approach resists qualitative and factually sensitive
inquiry. Twice in the course of his majority opinion, Justice Powell rejected
specific claims in part on the ground that doing so would commit the Court to
invalidating other governmental acts or omissions that he assumed were unobjectionable: in one instance, the failure to accommodate ill-fed or homeless
people, and in another, the use of local taxation to finance public services
such as police and fire protection. It is not productive to compare, in the
abstract, a discriminatory educational financing scheme with discriminatory
financing of other government services. Distinguishing these practices would
require the Court to understand, with some granularity, how they function, what
alternative approaches look like, and how they affect social welfare. Rather than
reserve judgment unless and until it is called upon to evaluate these downstream hypothetical cases, the Court instead assumed away its ability to make
complex qualitative assessments of broadly similar cases.
Third, and relatedly, the approach taken in Rodriguez seems to preclude any
role for the Court in adjudicating cases involving social and economic rights.
The tiers-of-scrutiny paradigm reflexively assigns such rights to the black hole of
rational basis review, in effect on the ground that their recognition disables the
society from engaging in workaday acts of self-governance. The Court’s hostility
to positive rights owes a significant debt to the progressive response to accusations made in the 1960s that support for reproductive rights entailed a resurrection of the infamous case of Lochner v. New York.23 Distinguishing reproductive
rights from Lochner on the basis of privacy reinforced arguments that rights that
materially affected others in concrete ways must succumb to legislative
21 Id., at 109 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
22 Id., at 59 (Stewart, J., concurring).
23 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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prerogative. In emphasizing the importance of local governance to its resolution
of the case, Rodriguez reflects those assumptions precisely.
The San Antonio schooling case is not, of course, the sole instance in which
the Court has adopted a categorical approach to rights adjudication, abided
aggressive slippery slope arguments, or assumed that qualitative inquiry
exceeded its competence. The categorical approach remains blackletter law in
equal protection and substantive due process cases, even as the claims of gay
and lesbian plaintiffs and others have applied significant pressure to that model
in specific instances.24 Slippery slope| concerns appear to have motivated the
Court’s reluctance to entertain “disparate impact”—known elsewhere as “indirect”—discrimination claims,25 claims that race had infected capital punishment
determinations,26 and claims that particular prison terms were disproportionate
and therefore “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment.27 Fear of
intrusion into democratic governance has led the Court categorically to reject
the very notion of positive constitutional duties, notwithstanding the Fourteenth
Amendment’s injunction to states to protect persons equally.28 The Court has
also shied away from identifying and adjudicating instances of conflicting
rights, as in its ongoing refusal to understand abortion, hate speech, or affirmative action cases in those terms.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s limited imagination when it comes to rights
adjudication is not just an idiosyncrasy or a benign variation in global judicial
practice. Nor is it dictated by the Constitution; modern rights adjudication in the
United States is not guided by the constitutional text.29 It is a pathology that, left
untreated, will prevent the Court from sensibly engaging in modern rights
adjudication. Human rights scholars sometimes speak in terms of first, second,
and third generation rights, which respectively span civil and political rights,
social and economic rights, and group and cultural rights. We need not adopt
this particular taxonomy, which has been much dissected and criticized, to
recognize that a maturing society should expect to confront different kinds of
rights claims over time even with respect to the same basic set of norms.
Human rights norms are typically born out of their customary and most
egregious applications. Thus, laws against racial discrimination begin by

24 See Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151 (2016).
25 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
26 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 314 (1987).
27 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003).
28 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 186.
29 See generally David A. Strauss, Foreword, Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129
HARV. L. REV. 1 (2015).
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targeting open or otherwise intentional derogation from norms of racial equality:
chattel slavery, apartheid regimes, and so forth. If the society adopts the norm,
we should expect instances of overt derogation to decline. New claims arise on
what initially appear to be norm’s margins: indirect discrimination, horizontal
effects, additional categories of rights bearers such as women, gays, or people
with disabilities, and so forth. Because these new claims are contested, they
invariably confront contrary claims grounded either in competing individual
rights or in broader rights of self-governance. The contrary claim holders do
not reject the norm itself, as the apartheid-era South African government
rejected the norm of racial equality. Rather, they reject some particular application or extension based on a competing right or entitlement that is prima facie
legitimate. They disagree as to how the norm should be understood, and their
disagreement is reasonable.30
Treating rights as categorical or binary, in effect in “rule” rather than
“standard” terms, fits early-stage rights claims far better than these later-stage
claims. An overt segregationist, ipso facto, does not respect rights of racial
equality, and so we have no cause to solicit his reasons or commitments in
this domain. The fact that the rights-holder wins must, again ipso facto, entail
that the segregationist loses. The facts relevant to this dispute are judicial facts—
did the segregation occur?—rather than legislative facts relating to the empirical
context. The remedy is just as straightforward as it would have been for the
Supreme Court to have ordered that Linda Brown be enrolled immediately in a
newly integrated elementary school in Topeka, Kansas.
When the segregation is unintentional or nonobvious, matters are more
complicated. It is no longer the case that the state actor’s commitments, in
this case to a well-functioning school system, are irrelevant. Those commitments
are valid, and they sound in a constitutional register: values of self-determination, federalism, and separation of powers exert pressure, again reasonably, on
the outcome. It is no longer sufficient to ascertain solely judicial facts, for the
nature of the plaintiff’s injury or the viability and effectiveness of particular
remedies might require empirical assessment. Other private actors, such as
parents who wish to send their children to geographically proximate schools,
and those who have made investments on the premise that such schools are
available to their children, have competing entitlements—and perhaps rights—
that are prima facie valid. In short, it is simply not possible to fit more mature
rights cases into prefabricated doctrinal categories, to adjudicate them without
accounting for social facts, to assume away or casually disregard the presence of
30 See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1368
(2005).
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other rights-bearers whose commitments are constitutionally salient, or to prejudge—wholesale—downstream cases that raise similar issues.31
An adjudicator confronted with this problem faces three basic options. First,
she can attempt to squeeze the new set of claims into old anachronistic categories. The Rodriguez Court attempted to jerry-rig claims of wealth discrimination in public schooling into established categories born of the ideology of white
supremacy. It failed in that attempt, but not because no rights were at stake in
Rodriguez, and not because educational rights were a poor fit for a constitutional
system that, less than two decades earlier, had called education “perhaps the
most important function of state and local governments “ and “the very foundation of good citizenship.”32 It is rather that a rights regime designed to combat
overt racism may treat rights as essentially absolute, whereas the recognition of
a right cannot be dispositive of a rights claim within a mature, cosmopolitan
political order.
The second option a modern adjudicator faces is overt abdication. If the
choices between the sides are between competing rights-holders, or require an
adjudicator to make qualitative and not just categorical judgments about the
necessary expenditure of government resources, or necessitate that she weigh
values that on their face appear to be incommensurable, it might seem that the
conflict falls outside judicial competence. This position approximates the one
taken by judicial review skeptics such as Jeremy Waldron.33 Waldron brackets
societies that lack a culture of respect for rights, which is another way of saying
that his universe is limited to those in which the paradigm cases that inspire
rights identification arise infrequently. For Waldron, once we posit that the
society at issue is one that takes rights seriously and has a well-functioning
democratic political system, it is difficult to justify relying on unelected and
unaccountable judges to adjudicate rights claims. The political branches are
competing arbiters of disagreement over the scope of rights, they have democratic credentials—which matters in a democracy—and judges are frequently
drawn to the technical and morally uninspired vernacular of doctrinal tests.34
Waldron’s argument is complex, and this is not the space to defend judicial
review as such. Three points bear mention, however. First, Waldron’s caveats
conceal some nuance that requires further exploration. Many societies that are

31 It is telling that application of strict scrutiny has become rare at the Supreme Court level. See
Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006).
32 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
33 See Waldron, supra note 30.
34 See id., at 1383.
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democratic and rights-respecting at a wholesale level might suffer from periodic
episodes that test those credentials at a retail level. Judicial review both deters
those episodes and enables an institutionalized response to them when they
occur. Indeed, in the 1938 case of United States v. Carolene Products,35 in which
the U.S. Supreme Court articulated its rational basis approach to most legislation, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone famously included a footnote that identified the
conditions under which legislation would not enjoy a presumption of constitutionality. Two of those conditions—the enactment of laws that impede processes
of political change and laws that discriminate against discrete and insular
minorities36—are but shorthand for the notion that judges should intervene
aggressively when, and just to the degree that, Waldron’s conditions of democracy and respect for rights do not obtain. A commitment to democracy and
respect for rights are dynamic rather than static features of a political order.
A second point in response to Waldron is to note that judicial review is a
persistent feature of modern constitutional systems that does not appear to be
going away. The proliferation of constitutional courts around the world suggests
at least an implicit mass rejection of his arguments. That rejection might not
move Waldron, whose interest is normative rather than descriptive, but the
ubiquity of constitutional courts does provide a canvas that may be used to
test Waldron’s insights regarding rights contestation. In a world that is secondbest from Waldron’s perspective, we have good reason to ask whether and how
existing institutions of judicial review could be modified so as better to meet his
objections.
The third point, which is related, is that Waldron explicitly brackets
mechanisms of weak-form judicial review that enable some form of legislative
response to a judicial finding of unconstitutionality. What we might call formal
weak-form review, in which ordinary legislative majorities have a constitutionally prescribed authority to supercede or limit judicial interpretations of the
Constitution, is uncommon. But many constitutional courts adopt adjudicative
procedures, such as proportionality review, or remedial mechanisms, such as
suspensions of invalidity, that invite political engagement.
The adaptability of such mechanisms to the strong-form review that characterizes American practice is the subject of Part II below. The key takeaway for now
is that the presence or absence of these mechanisms is endogenous to a court’s
capacity to adjudicate rights cases under conditions of reasonable disagreement.
As scholars such as Richard Fallon and Daryl Levinson have emphasized, justiciability, the merits, and remedial doctrines are deeply interdependent at the
35 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
36 Id., at 152 n.4.
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Supreme Court.37 It is nearly tautological to say that mature, rights-respecting
democracies that do not take concrete measures to soften their forms of
review have a harder time justifying rights review at all: a mature rights jurisprudence is simply incompatible with the strongest forms of judicial review in a
democracy.
The life cycle of rights that I allude to above motivates the practices of many
modern and respected constitutional courts in pluralistic societies, what Kai
Möller calls “the global model of constitutional rights.” By this he means “rights
inflation”38—that is, understanding rights as “protecting an extreme range of
interests”39—along with “positive obligations and socio-economic rights, horizontal effect, and balancing and proportionality.”40 Adopting, or at least
approaching, this model is the third option available to courts adjudicating
mature rights in a pluralistic society.
Modern rights claims, because contested and marginal, are by their nature
susceptible to slippery slope arguments that are defeasible in a principled way
only in a proportionality regime. The positive dimensions of rights that lead to
government and private obligations, are not, a priori, morally distinguishable
from their negative dimensions. And in a mature, rights-respecting society, we
can expect rights often to populate both sides of a constitutional dispute. The
approach that Rodriguez epitomizes—categorical, empirically impoverished,
enamored with slippery slope appeals, and reflexively hostile to social and
economic rights—is incompatible with such a society’s reasonable demands.

II Reforming a Private Law Court
The U.S. Supreme Court was designed primarily to adjudicate common law
diversity suits between private parties. Every American law student is taught
in the first week of his or her constitutional law class that the Court’s most
solemn public function—its power to nullify legislative acts—derives purely from
its power to resolve disputes between quintessentially private parties. When
Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in Marbury v. Madison that “[i]t is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,”41 he
37 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—and Their
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633 (2006); Levinson, supra note 10.
38 KAI MÖLLER, THE GLOBAL MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 2 (2012).
39 Id., at 1.
40 Id., at 2.
41 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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meant that the Constitution is law, and if a dispute between Mr Marbury and Mr
Madison—or the Court’s capacity to hear that dispute—turns on the meaning of
the Constitution, then the Court has both the power and the duty to interpret it.42
This model of adjudication aligns with what Henry Monaghan has called the
“dispute resolution model,” which “focuses upon the actual dispute between
the litigants.”43 This model polices the Article III “case or controversy” requirement—and its implied limits on standing—rigorously and on principle. It entertains doctrines of constitutional avoidance so as to declare the nation’s basic
law only when constrained to do so. It grounds its judgment in the record
developed based on an adversarial presentation by the litigants. It relies on
those litigants to raise and actively litigate any legal questions the court decides.
Its remedies are structured to afford relief in the case before it and not in others.
The nature of the effect, if any, of one judgment on the outcomes of other similar
cases is in terrorem rather than erga omnes.
The alternative to the dispute resolution model approximates what
Monaghan calls the “law declaration model,” whose focus is “on the judicial
role in saying what the law is.”44 On this model, the Court is an oracle of the law
for the nation.45 It backgrounds the concerns of any particular litigants, with a
sharper interest in broader concerns about the state of the law. It is eager to
decide issues before they arrive through a traditional dispute-resolution vehicle.
Its opinions are laden with empirical data and outside research that has not
necessarily been tested through adversarial litigation. It is open to remedies that
address underlying political structures rather than simply the needs of the
parties. Its practices inch closer to those of a legislature because it understands
its function in the same quasi-legislative terms as a Kelsenian court.46
Arguably, the dispute resolution model better matches the expectations of
the U.S. Constitution’s drafters and ratifiers. As noted, that model underlies
Chief Justice Marshall’s Marbury opinion. It is telling that the Marbury case itself
was not decided until 14 years into the Court’s life, and the Court invalidated a
federal law just twice prior to the Civil War, both times in obvious dicta.47 The
dispute resolution model is consistent with the Constitutional Convention’s
42 See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008).
43 Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 665, 668 (2012) [hereinafter Monaghan, Avoidance]. Monaghan earlier called
this model the “private rights model.” Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The
Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1365–66 (1973).
44 See Monaghan, Avoidance, supra note 43, at 668.
45 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69 (1765–1769).
46 See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 268 (1949).
47 See Marbury, 5 U.S. 137; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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rejection of the Virginia Plan’s proposal to empower judges to act as a Council of
Revision that would hold a qualified veto over both state and congressional
laws.48 It is also consistent with the absence of general federal question jurisdiction prior to 1875. Some aspects of the dispute resolution model appear to have
motivated the Supreme Court’s refusal to advise President Washington on a set
of questions proffered by Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson regarding the Jay
Treaty and maritime and foreign relations law in 1793.49
At times the Court and commentators behave as if the dispute resolution
model is still the Court’s primary one. As Justice Alito wrote in the lead opinion
in Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation,50 a case rejecting taxpayer standing to challenge President George W. Bush’s faith-based initiative program:
[T]he judicial power of the United States defined by Art. III is not an unconditioned
authority to determine the constitutionality of legislative or executive acts. The federal
courts are not empowered to seek out and strike down any governmental act that they
deem to be repugnant to the Constitution. Rather, federal courts sit solely, to decide on the
rights of individuals, and must refrai[n] from passing upon the constitutionality of an act …
unless obliged to do so in the proper performance of our judicial function, when the
question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it.51

Amanda Frost has noted the continuing hold the notion of party control over
litigation has on the federal courts. As she writes, “[J]udicial opinions and the
academic literature confidently promote party presentation, and are critical of
judges who raise issues sua sponte.”52
Notwithstanding frequent paeans to the dispute resolution model, a funny
thing happened on the way to the twenty-first century. Over time, Congress
shrunk the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction, most dramatically in 1925 and most
recently in 1988.53 Unlike the federal courts of appeals, which are courts of error
that hear mandatory appeals, the Supreme Court has nearly plenary control over
its docket. It deliberately refuses to engage in error-correction in individual
cases, and it deliberately seeks out instances in which lower courts disagree

48 See 1 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 21 (1911).
49 See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Why the Supreme Court Never Gets Any “Dear John” Letters:
Advisory Opinions in Historical Perspective, 87 GEO. L.J. 473, 489–90 (1998) (reviewing
STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES (1997)).
50 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (Alito, J.).
51 Id., at 598 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
52 Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 451 (2009).
53 See Act of 13 February 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936; Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100 –352, 102 Stat. 662.
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about the interpretation of the law.54 Not infrequently, the Court ignores the
question presented by the parties and instead crafts its own.55 Simply put, the
Court’s lived self-conception is as a law-declaration court even as it often
approaches actual cases as if it is a dispute-resolution court.
The American model is sometimes presented as if it is one of two (or more)
competing conceptions of rights adjudication, either of which a jurisdiction
might choose depending on its particular history and political structure. In
fact, the American model is simply anachronistic and therefore inadequate to
modern rights adjudication. Other jurisdictions’ relative refusal to cite American
cases bears some testimony to their dated decisional structure.56 Below, I discuss three features of the model that must be reformed if the model is to address
modern rights conflicts with sensitivity to the nature of such conflicts. Unless the
Court reforms its practices along each of these lines, it will continue to lag well
behind other courts in its capacity to adjudicate the sorts of disputes likely to
arise in modern, pluralistic societies.

A Proportionality
Proportionality analysis is an institutionalized and systematic approach to judicial balancing. It typically includes at least two distinct stages at which the
reviewing court assesses a challenged action’s means-ends fit and its degree of
necessity. If necessary, the Court then balances either the overall costs (in rights
terms) and benefits (in policy terms) of the challenged action or its marginal
benefit in achieving its policy objective against the marginal cost to the asserted
right. Proportionality is a feature of judicial review within nearly all of the
constitutional systems that have been subjects of extensive study in the
English-language literature, including those of Canada, South Africa, Israel,
many Asian courts, and most European and Latin American constitutional
courts (including at the regional level).57
Proportionality is not an explicit feature of U.S. constitutional law. There is
some disagreement as to the degree to which proportionality has implicitly
infiltrated (or has long been present within) American constitutional law.
54 See Sup. Ct. R. 10.
55 See Frost, supra note 52, at 451.
56 See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution,
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 767–68 (2012).
57 See AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
179–206 (2012); Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, Proportionality Balancing and Global
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 74 (2008).
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Stephen Gardbaum has noted that the American tiers of scrutiny analysis is, in
practice, sensitive to context, just as proportionality regimes in other jurisdictions are sensitive to the nature of the right in assigning a burden of justification
to the government.58 Vicki Jackson has noted the recognition of proportionality
as a legal principle in American Eighth Amendment and certain Fourteenth
Amendment contexts.59 Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews have located proportionality analysis deep within American case law, in its nineteenth-century
negative Commerce Clause doctrine.60 On the other hand, Moshe Cohen-Eliya
and Iddo Porat distinguish proportionality, a jurisprudential commitment, from
balancing, an interstitial safety valve, and conclude that the former is in tension
with American values of individualism and the U.S. constitutional culture’s
focus on legal authority rather than justification.61
It is fair to say that, although many individual areas of U.S. constitutional
doctrine contain elements of proportionality analysis, proportionality is not,
overall, a feature of U.S. constitutional law. Supreme Court opinions that relax
or ignore the tiers of scrutiny analysis—such as Obergefell v. Hodges, holding
that states may not deny marriage rights to same sex couples,62 or Grutter v.
Bollinger, in which the Court ostensibly applied strict scrutiny in upholding a
race-based affirmative action plan at a public law school63—tend to do so sub
rosa. Failing to acknowledge proportionality sits in tension with one of proportionality’s essential features: its trans-substantivity. The fact that proportionality
is used across rights areas alters the analytic center of gravity, away from
specific models of rights identification and towards the rationality and necessity
of the governmental act. As Möller explains, courts on what we might call the
European model “are very generous in labeling an interest a ‘right,’” and at the
same time, necessarily, “they do not attach much weight to a right simply by
virtue of its being a right.”64 To say that proportionality is used only sometimes
begs the question; it sits in tension with a core tenet of a proportionality
commitment.
This feature of proportionality analysis is critical in distinguishing it from
the U.S. model and in recommending it for modern rights adjudication. Shifting
58 See Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional Exceptionalism,
107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 417–19 (2008).
59 See Jackson, supra note 6, at 3104–05.
60 Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights Review and the
Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797 (2011).
61 See COHEN-ELIYA & PORAT, supra note 8, at 52–53,126–29.
62 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2071 (2015).
63 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
64 MÖLLER, supra note 38, at 5.
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the analytic weight from identification of the right and the right-bearer to
assessment of the government’s justification accomplishes two objectives essential to judging within a mature rights regime.
First, it sidesteps arguments over whether a particular claim activates constitutional analysis in the first place, avoiding the polarizing analysis that tells
the losing plaintiff, who by hypothesis has suffered a concrete injury at the
hands of a government actor, that he or she is simply beneath any constitutional
concern.
Rights inflation has come in for much criticism. As Grégoire Webber has
argued, suggesting that rights are everywhere (but subject to limitation) can
deprive the law of a vocabulary for articulating why rights are special and may
underwrite an antagonistic attitude toward the political process.65 I think this
criticism too sanguine about the ability of either courts or legislatures to draw
stable and persuasive distinctions between constitutional rights and mere interests. The relative weight of an asserted right enters the analysis, but only in
proportionality’s final stage, should the court get so far. In an environment of
persistent and reasonable disagreement over the specification of rights, a court
better stays within its lane when expressive value judgments are held in reserve.
The second benefit of proportionality analysis within a mature rights regime
is that it preserves the government’s ability to prevail notwithstanding identification of a constitutional right. Proportionality analysis thereby not only takes
seriously the constitutional right of self-governance even in the face of prima
facie rights claims, but also—and at least as importantly—substantially mitigates
a court’s instinct to deny rights claims entirely based on fallacious slippery slope
arguments.
Consider the San Antonio case we began with. Recall that the Rodriguez
Court adopted an atomized and categorical approach that led it to deny that any
rights had been violated. The Court also denied relief in part based on concerns
about a slippery slope to court rulings that would threaten local governance in
areas far afield of education. Under a proportionality approach, the Court would
have understood the plaintiffs’ claims in broad, prima facie terms. Without
speculating as to how a good-faith proportionality court would approach the
San Antonio case, it is not difficult to understand severe wealth discrimination
in public education as implicating constitutional equality guarantees. That
recognition is far less threatening when automatic invalidity does not follow.
What would follow instead is an inquiry into whether the government is justified
in discriminating in this way. Is the state pursuing a legitimate objective? Does
65 See GRÉGOIRE C.N. WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION: ON THE LIMITATION OF RIGHTS
(2009).

54

J. Greene

wealth discrimination serve that objective? Are there other ways of serving the
objective that would not cause the same kind of injury? How does the marginal
contribution of the government’s policy to its ultimate objective relate to the
marginal injury to Edgewood residents of a policy that discriminates in this way?
However, a court answers these questions, the benefit of this approach is
that it prompts a court to answer these questions, about this policy, in relation to
these rights claims. Under a mature rights regime, those on all sides of a rights
conflict disagree reasonably about how far rights reach. They deserve to have
their concerns taken seriously in the case before the court.66 When rights sit at
the margins of a human rights norm, a minor change in fact could have a major
impact on a case outcome. Deciding hypothetical cases adopts overly simplistic
assumptions about the nature of rights. In refusing to confront rights assertions
in their own marginal terms, the Court denudes the right of any power at all.
And so even conceding that, relative to Europeans, Americans are liberal rather
than communitarian in their rights orientations, as Cohen-Eliya and Porat have
argued,67 the Court’s continued resistance to proportionality is self-defeating.
Rights bearers are at least as vulnerable to the U.S. model as the state is.
A proportionality approach would enable courts to adjudicate disparate
impact claims on a case-by-case basis, just as they do routinely under federal,
state, and local antidiscrimination laws that recognize indirect discrimination.68
A racial impact that was foreseeable and avoidable but not specifically sought
out would become a (defeasible) matter of constitutional concern rather than a
constitutional irrelevancy. Government actors contemplating a policy with a
disparate racial impact would have incentives to mitigate that impact.
Several conflicts in American constitutional law that currently involve deliberate obfuscation or formalistic distractions by litigants and judges could be
adjudicated more transparently under proportionality analysis. For example,
public institutions that engage in affirmative action assert that diversity is
their only objective, and courts pretend that they treat race-based affirmative
action policies with the same degree of scrutiny reserved for Jim Crow laws.
Litigants seeking rights for gays and lesbians argue that rational policies are
66 See ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE 142
(2000).
67 See COHEN-ELIYA & PORAT, supra note 8.
68 See, e. g., Tex. Dep’t of Housing & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 135 S. Ct.
2507 (2015) (holding that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act);
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (holding that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971) (holding that disparate impact claims are cognizable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964).
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irrational, because courts are unwilling (again, for fear of slippery slopes) to
remove sexual orientation discrimination from the rational basis bucket.69 The
gun control debate continues to be framed in the pedantic terms set by the
litigation in District of Columbia v. Heller—is there an individual right to bear
arms under the Second Amendment?—rather than in terms of what kinds of
regulation of guns are nonetheless permissible. Opponents of the Affordable
Care Act, which penalizes some individuals who do not carry health insurance,
awkwardly framed their arguments as grounded in federalism rather than individual autonomy, and the Supreme Court awkwardly abided that framing.
Proportionality analysis would not eliminate conflict about these matters
but it would channel disagreement in more productive directions. Litigants
could argue about empirical facts in the world instead of parsing eighteenthor nineteenth-century dictionaries. The Court’s resolution of rights conflict
would not be zero sum for all time, and so actors within civil society would
have good reason to remain engaged in the legal and political negotiation that
should lie at the root of a pluralistic democracy. Moreover, part of Waldron’s
concern with judicial intervention into rights conflicts was that judges are too
accustomed to thinking in the technical terms of legal doctrine rather than
deliberating about rights directly. This legitimate concern hits with less force
in a proportionality regime.
There are at least three broad objections to proportionality that temper its
adoption in U.S. courts. First, the U.S. Supreme Court is the apex court in a vast
federal system. Every Article III court and every state supreme court, among
other state courts, has jurisdiction over federal constitutional questions.
Although many apex courts in decentralized systems adopt proportionality
analysis—including Canada’s, most prominently—the felt need for such courts
to articulate intelligible rules that promote uniformity and discourage bias in
federal law counterbalances some of the advantages proportionality offers.
This objection, while not fallacious, is unpersuasive as a reason to reject
proportionality. For one thing, the Court adopts balancing analysis and totality
of the circumstances tests on a regular basis but does so on essentially an ad hoc
basis. For another, because of the pressure modern rights adjudication exerts on
rule-bound adjudication, the Court’s existing categories tend to break down in
unpredictable and unsystematic ways. Note also that the Court, for undisclosed
reasons of its own devising, has dramatically reduced its docket over the last
69 See, e. g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(“Interests in uniformity and stability amply justified Congress’s decision to retain the definition
of marriage that, at that point, had been adopted by every State in our Nation, and every nation
in the world.”).
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three decades. In the 1980s the Court routinely heard more than 150 cases
per term.70 In the 2015 Term, it heard 80. This docket reduction suggests an
implicit judgment that lower courts are not in desperate need of guidance from
above. “The Court,” Kenneth Starr has written, “by and large does not even
pretend to maintain the uniformity of federal law.”71 Finally, the presence of
proportionality in other decentralized systems offers some evidence for its
viability in the United States.
A second broad objection is grounded in U.S. constitutional history. Lawyers
trained within the American system see in proportionality analysis the ghost of
Lochner v. New York.72 There, the Supreme Court invalidated a maximum hour
law for bakers that had been passed unanimously by the New York legislature.
Justice Rufus Peckham’s Lochner majority opinion held, consistent with earlier
cases,73 that the Fourteenth Amendment protected a right to contract. The right
was not absolute and could be limited through an appropriate exercise of the
state’s police power, but in this case the state had not demonstrated that bakers’
work was unusually dangerous or in need of regulation or that bakers lacked the
capacity to bargain freely over their working conditions.
The Lochner Court captured the methodological spirit of modern proportionality analysis. The opinion devotes no attention to establishing the bona fides of
a right to contract as an interpretive matter but devotes substantial energy to
exploring why the state’s asserted reasons for regulation were inadequate.74
Namely,
[t]he act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end itself must be
appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held to be valid which interferes with the
general right of an individual to be free in his person and in his power to contract in
relation to his own labor.75

The fact that proportionality analysis is Lochner’s methodological cousin stands
as a substantial obstacle to its open use in U.S. courts. A judge who assumes a
broad reach of the Fourteenth Amendment into areas, such as contract, not
specifically enumerated, and who scrutinizes means-ends fit even for rights that
today are evaluated under a rational basis standard invites a dissenter to accuse
70 LEE EPSTEIN, ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 86 tbl. 2–6 (2015). Notably, nothing
in this article’s proposal would make it necessary for that number to rise.
71 Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard
Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1365 (2006).
72 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see Jackson, supra note 6, at 3126.
73 See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
74 See Gardbaum, supra note 58, at 425.
75 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57–58.
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her of “Lochnerizing.”76 Being affiliated with the case counts as an epithet
within the U.S. constitutional tradition.77 Until that changes, proportionality
proponents will have difficulty making inroads in the United States.
Be that as it may, Lochner’s status as an anticanonical decision is not
sacrosanct. Although judges continue to use Lochner as a reason for rejecting
claims implicating social and economic legislation, Lochner revisionism is rampant within the American legal academy.78 It is worth noting, moreover, that it is
notionally possible to reject the result in Lochner without rejecting its methodology. Indeed, the best reading of Justice John Marshall Harlan’s Lochner dissent is
that it did just that. Justice Harlan accepted the existence of a constitutional
right to contract but argued based on empirical evidence—some of which he
described as judicially noticed—that bakers’ work is at least arguably as dangerous as the statute’s defenders claimed. The dispute between Justice Peckham
and Justice Harlan is an ordinary argument about the actual state of the world
the legislature sought to regulate.
By contrast, the dispute between Justice Peckham and Justice Holmes,
whose Lochner dissent is better known than Justice Harlan’s, reflects an ideological divide over the judicial role. Justice Holmes’s dissent states that legislation
should be free of judicial interference “unless it can be said that a rational and
fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe
fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our
people and our law.”79 This formulation is the precursor of the two-tier U.S.
model, under which legislation is reviewed deferentially unless it falls into a
protected category.
There is nothing inevitable about adopting the Holmes rather than the
Harlan critique of Lochner. Progressive thinkers influential in interring the
Lochner era, such as Louis Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter, were Holmes acolytes, and Holmes himself of course sat on the Court for more than a quarter
century after Lochner was decided. Those facts explain the special status of the
Holmes dissent as well as any others. But the categorical approach has proven
itself inadequate to the task of confronting claims growing out of new categories
of rights holders, those that implicate the government fisc or conflicting rights,
76 See, e. g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015), (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.455, 459–60 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
77 See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011).
78 See, e. g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 213–24 (2004); DAVID E.
BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE
REFORM (2011); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION 338 (2014).
79 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76, (Holmes, J., dissenting).

58

J. Greene

and those that impose duties on others. It is past time for a judicial resurrection
of the Harlan critique.
Which leads to the third major objection to proportionality: judicial competence. Justice Harlan based his dissenting opinion on certain claims about the
dangers of baking that, as he noted, are subject to reasonable disagreement.80 A
categorical approach tends to reduce the instances in which judges must rely on
social facts that they lack the institutional capacity to adduce and assess. As
Jackson notes, “[I]n situations of epistemic or normative uncertainty, legislatures
may be more empirically competent and democratically legitimate than courts in
making prognostic factual determinations and in making accommodations
among competing values.”81 The U.S. model seeks to avoid this morass. In its
most aggressive formulation, it permits case outcomes to turn on hypothetical
states of affairs that are outside the record as a basis for rejecting most rights
challenges.82 In those exceptional cases in which rights claims receive heightened scrutiny, the government—whose fact-finding capacity typically exceeds
that of private litigants—is burdened with producing evidence sufficient to
establish the requisite means-ends fit.
It is not enough to note that judges in other jurisdictions regularly make
judgments requiring them to develop and evaluate legislative facts. We must say
more about the institutional mechanisms in place to do so, and how they relate
to those in the U.S. system. I turn to those mechanisms below.

B An Inquisitorial Approach to Legislative Facts
Among the most startling passages in Justice Powell’s Rodriguez opinion is the
Court’s discussion of whether the residents of poor school districts are poor. At a
glance, this might seem to be the sort of fact about which the Court could take
judicial notice. The Federal Rules of Evidence permit judicial notice of “a fact
that is not subject to reasonable dispute.”83 The Rules limit such notice, however, to “adjudicative” rather than “legislative” facts.84 As Kenneth Culp Davis
originally defined them, adjudicative facts are those “concerning the immediate
parties—who did what, where, when, how, and with what motive or intent.”85

80 Id., at 72 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
81 Jackson, supra note 6, at 3145.
82 See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955).
83 Fed. R. Evid., 201.
84 Fed. R. Evid., 201(a).
85 Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945, 952 (1955).
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These are the facts that we permit juries to decide in jury trials.86 Legislative
facts, by contrast, are “those which help the tribunal to determine the content of
law and policy and to exercise its judgment or discretion in determining what
course of action to take.”87 As Davis write, legislative facts “are ordinarily
general” and are not uniquely related to the parties or their activities.88
What is most alarming about the Rodriguez Court’s treatment of the question
of whether poor school districts house poor people is less its answer, (though its
answer—no—was counterintuitive) than its method of investigation. The Court
relied on a student note in the Yale Law Journal that analyzed educational
financing in Connecticut.89 But the relevant question is either one about judicial
facts—do the poor school districts in San Antonio contain poor people?—or
about legislative facts—do poor school districts generally contain poor people?
In neither case is a single, untested study from a different state, more than 1,500
miles away and radically different politically, economically, and culturally even
probative of the answer to the question, much less dispositive.
Serious constitutional adjudication requires that a reviewing court have
some reliable means of receiving accurate and relevant factual information.
That imperative is valuable for any constitutional court, but it is essential for a
court that intends to apply proportionality analysis, engage in balancing, or
routinely draw qualitative distinctions between similar cases. Under those circumstances, the facts that motivate that qualitative assessment may be “decisive
of constitutional claims” and therefore approximate “constitutional facts.”90
And like constitutional facts, such facts have a quasi-legal character and therefore should be assessed non-deferentially by a reviewing court.
The problem is that in the U.S. system, the Supreme Court and other
appellate courts have no reliable method of identifying, soliciting, or adjudicating disagreements relating to legislative facts. For judicial facts, the adversarial,
private law model relies on the parties to present evidence to the trial court,
usually in the form of lay witnesses or relevant documents. In significant
constitutional cases, however, judicial facts are minimally relevant. The Court
itself has conceded the relative unimportance of judicial facts in its certiorari
86 See id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 23 (1973); see Note, A Statistical
Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303
(1972).
90 Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 230 (1985).
Monaghan applies the label only to adjudicative facts, id., n.16, but judicial review of legislative
facts that decide constitutional claims is equally in need of scrutiny.
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practices. As the Court’s rules stipulate, a cert petition “is rarely granted when
the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of
a properly stated rule of law.”91 In memoranda that Supreme Court law clerks
circulate to the Justices advising whether to grant petitions, the standard language recommending the denial of most petitions is: “fact-bound error-correction.”92 Instead, as noted, the most significant criterion for a grant is a division
of authority within the circuits relating to the appropriate rule of law or the
application of that rule to analogous sets of facts.93 The facts of any individual
case are relevant only if similar facts apply broadly to other cases as well. Put
more simply, the Court does not actually care about the particular circumstances
of individual litigants.
The facts that matter in the high-stakes rights cases that form the core of the
Court’s constitutional docket are quite particular to the issue at stake, but they
are not particular to the litigants who happened to press them. What is the
relationship between indigence and housing?94 What are the educational and
societal benefits of a diverse student body at elite schools?95 Are so-called
partial birth abortions ever medically necessary?96 Do women who have such
abortions tend to regret doing so?97 Does capital punishment deter crime?98
What forms of gun control were prevalent in late eighteenth century America?99
These questions are about the state of the world rather than any particular
individual’s conduct or circumstances. The answers to these questions are
legislative (also called social) facts.
American appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, have no reliable
means of ascertaining the answers to these kinds of questions. The default is for
the parties themselves to introduce expert testimony. But the private law, adversarial model that supports this practice is ill suited to legislative factfinding. The
Rules of Evidence are silent on legislative facts. Judicial facts are reviewed under a
“clear error” standard,100 but that standard is awkward for facts that are relevant
to a broad swath of cases and that will support a legal conclusion that affects the
entire nation. The Supreme Court itself has noted that multiple courts might
91 SUP. CT. R. 10.
92 See Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1140 (2011).
93 SUP CT. R. 10(a)-(b).
94 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1.
95 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
96 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
97 See id., at 159.
98 See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2767–68 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
99 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 683–87 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
100 FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
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readily reach conflicting conclusions about legislative facts.101 There is no reason
to suppose that the particular litigants whose case happens to become the Court’s
vehicle for a rights question will litigate the case aggressively and competently,
hire the appropriate experts, or apprise the Court of all relevant data.102
The Court’s current practices are not promising. Kenneth Culp Davis wrote
three decades ago of seven responses the Court tends to have when confronted
with the need for legislative facts that it does not have.103 I discuss each below.
First, it might remand to the trial court for factfinding. This approach is
inadequate for the reasons just discussed. A trial court’s finding of legislative
facts under conditions of adversarial presentation does not match what the
Court implicitly concedes to be the quasi-legislative function of its constitutional
rights adjudication. No one would design a system of judicial lawmaking by
delegating constitutional factfinding to essentially random and decentralized
trial courts possessing little or no inquisitorial power.
Second, the Court “simply asserts an emphatic view of the legislative facts,
with nothing to support its view.”104 This practice is surprisingly common in
light of its obvious pathologies. Davis’s example was United States v. Butler,105 in
which the Court invalidated the Agricultural Adjustment Act as exceeding
Congress’s taxing and spending authority. Davis argued that the Court’s assertion of “a widespread similarity of local conditions”106 was “contrary to the view
of all economists of the time.”107 More recently, in Citizens United v. FEC, Justice
Kennedy wrote a majority opinion rejecting the government’s reasons for prohibiting corporate electioneering expenditures in which he asserted, without
evidence, that “[t]he appearance of influence or access [by wealthy corporations]
will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.”108 A 2012 survey
conducted by the Brennan Center for Justice found that one in four Americans
were less likely to vote because of the influence of large donors.109 Some
engagement with information of this sort would be a good practice.

101 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168 n.3 (1986).
102 See Kenneth Culp Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450, 470 (1970).
103 See Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed
Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1986).
104 Id., at 9.
105 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
106 Id., at 75.
107 See Davis, supra note 103, at 9.
108 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010).
109 Brennan Ctr. for Just., NATIONAL SURVEY: SUPER PACS, CORRUPTION, AND DEMOCRACY 3
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Third, the Court relies on judicial notice. The Rules of Evidence, which
prohibit taking judicial notice of legislative facts, are not binding on the
Supreme Court.110 Still, the kinds of legislative facts on which constitutional
disputes turn are often contested and therefore are not appropriate for judicial
notice. In Gonzales v. Carhart,111 the Court stated, “While we find no reliable data
to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some
women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created
and sustained.”112 Some measure of the prevalence of the asserted phenomenon
would have been relevant to whether Congress could use it as the basis for an
abortion restriction.
Fourth, the Court “examine[s] a published source and find[s] what is not
there.”113 Davis’s example was Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, in which the Court
relied on the two-person minority report of a 19-member study to conclude that
“there is at least an arguable correlation between obscene material and
crime.”114 As David Richards and others have noted, the Court “flatly ignore[d]
the great body of empirical evidence that shows there to be no empirical basis
for such a view.”115
Fifth, the Court is entirely silent, as when the Citizens United Court held that
“independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give
rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption”116 without citing any evidence, without discussing the record, and without acknowledging that it was
answering a factual rather than a purely legal question.117
Sixth, the Court resolves the problem by placing the burden of proof on one
of the parties. To return to Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court rejected a facial
challenge to the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act and instead placed the burden
on women and their doctors to prove that the banned procedure was medically
necessary in their case. Doing so reverses the usual presumption in abortion
rights cases, which requires a statutory exemption for abortion restrictions.
The final strategy for engaging with legislative facts that Davis discusses is
diligent extra-record research, as with Justice Blackmun’s famous trip to the

110 Fed. R. Evid., 1101(a).
111 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
112 Id., at 159.
113 Davis, supra note 103, at 9.
114 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973).
115 David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First
Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 84 (1974).
116 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357.
117 See Gorod, supra note 9, at 28–30.
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Mayo Clinic in preparation for his opinion in Roe v. Wade.118 For the modern
Court, both the dramatic proliferation of amicus briefs119—itself an implicit
recognition that many cases turn on legislative facts that the record undersupplies—and the vast store of electronic information available online make
such trips unnecessary.120
Relying on amici and independent Internet or other in camera extra-record
research to supply critical legislative facts is not just awkward or second-best: it
is pathological. The material contained in amicus briefs submitted to the Court is
untested by any adversarial process or expert review and it often contains
factual errors.121 Since the filing of amicus briefs typically requires organizational capacity and legal resources, their presence may be weighted towards
positions whose proponents enjoy those qualities.122 The Internet is a minefield
of misleading and/or out-of-date information. Neither the parties nor other
interested actors are given any opportunity to comment upon or rebut extrarecord research, which is itself often hastily prepared. Even where they are
apprised that such research has occurred, the thirty minutes each side is
typically given at oral argument is wholly inadequate to rebut newly introduced
evidence. Assertions made by amici are often too numerous for the parties to
engage with in their briefs, which are policed through strict page limits.
Were we to design a system of judicial lawmaking from scratch, we would
presumably provide the court with a staff competent to conduct empirical research
and resourced to commission it, and we would give the parties the opportunity to
respond to that research.123 But because our system was developed with common
law, private law disputes in mind, courts, in Brianne Gorod’s words, “ignore the
rules when they are considering cases that turn … on legislative facts.”124
In considering ways in which the Court could improve its ability to use
legislative facts, we can divide the possibilities into those the Court could pursue
on its own and those that would require rulemaking or congressional intervention. This division does not necessarily track how radical a departure each
suggestion represents.
118 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
119 See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the
Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743 (2000).
120 See Frederick Schauer, The Decline of “The Record”: A Comment on Posner, 51 DUQ. L. REV.
51, 56 (2013).
121 See Alli Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757 (2014).
122 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 36 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“There is no selfinterested organization out there devoted to pursuit of the truth in the federal courts.”).
123 See Davis, supra note 103, at 9.
124 Gorod, supra note 9, at 38.
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Within the first category, the Court could adjust rules of standing, both
within the lower courts and at the Court itself, so as to permit better informed
parties or public institutions to initiate litigation; it could make more aggressive
use of its authority to appoint a special master to take evidence and issue
findings; it could broaden or lengthen oral argument to permit participation of
interested parties or to allow the Court to hear evidence and question witnesses;
and it could solicit party responses to extra record evidence that plays an
important role in the Court’s decision-making. Within the second category, the
Judicial Conference could recommend changes in the rules for third-party intervention in lower court cases and Congress could establish a judicial research
service akin to the Congressional Research Service.125
Several of these innovations would mirror what occurs in Kelsenian courts,
such as abstract review, which is common at such courts,126 and the use of oral
argument to receive factual information, including from nonparties, rather than
just to hear legal arguments.127 Consistent with the approach of its civil and
criminal courts, the German Constitutional Court adopts an inquisitorial
approach to factfinding, not only hearing and receiving evidence directly, but
also appointing legal experts on its own initiative, requesting information or
documents from administrative agencies, or appointing judges as independent
investigators.128
We should be cautious in assuming that these procedural choices are
appropriate to a court system with a common law and adversarial tradition
and, moreover, the challenges involved in receiving and adjudicating legislative
or social facts is hardly unique to the U.S. Supreme Court.129 The tension
between the judicial role and the complex policy analysis necessary for modern
rights adjudication is an inherent one. Inviting outside experts or NGOs to
participate in cases risks inviting an agenda that may not in any meaningful
sense represent either the plaintiffs or the public at large.130
At the same time, we should not assume that procedural norms apply
equally well regardless of the nature of the case or the number of people its
125 See id., at 11; Davis, supra note 103, at 17.
126 See Louis Favoreu, American and European Models of Constitutional Justice, in
COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 105, 113 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard
Zimmermann, 1990).
127 See DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 27 (3d ed. 2012).
128 See Jula Hughes & Vanessa MacDonnell, Social Science in Constitutional Rights Cases in
Germany and Canada: Some Comparative Observations, 32 NAT’L J. CONST. L. 23, 40–41 (2013).
129 See id.
130 See Carol Harlow, Public Law and Popular Justice, 65 MODERN L. REV. 1 (2002).
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resolution affects.131 Current Supreme Court practice notionally adopts that
posture, which is not well-suited to a docket and a set of operative legal
questions that look quite different than that of a typical trial court. The fact
that these kinds of problems plague other courts as well is not a reason to leave
them unaddressed. The first step in treating any pathology is diagnosing it.

C Flexible Remedies
In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,132 the
Supreme Court invalidated the racial integration plans of school districts in
Seattle and Louisville because of the improper use of race as a factor in school
assignment. Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opinion for four Justices in which he
said that the use of racial targets for schools in the absence of a remedial order
from a court constituted impermissible racial balancing and was “patently
unconstitutional.”133 This conclusion reflects the kind of binary thinking about
rights and government obligations that this article has sought to resist: a plan
that could be constitutionally required if ordered by a court because of past de
jure segregation could be patently unconstitutional if undertaken voluntarily to
address a self-diagnosed problem or even (as in Seattle’s case) in response to the
threat of litigation. Only a categorical approach that assesses the bona fides of
government action using crude heuristics could produce this sharp a dichotomy.
Equally concerning, however, was the Court’s remedy. Justice Kennedy did
not join Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, but instead wrote a separate and
narrower concurrence that amounts to the Court’s ratio decidendi. Justice
Kennedy did not agree with the Chief Justice that the school districts had failed
to articulate a compelling interest justifying the use of racial classifications, but
he argued that their application of those classifications was too imprecise to
withstand strict scrutiny. In Louisville, the school district was unable even to
identify exactly how it used race, and in Seattle the district used blunt, binary
classifications of “white” and “nonwhite” even though the student population
was racially diverse. After explaining that this imprecision was fatal to the
school district’s plan, Justice Kennedy wrote the following remarkable sentence
as prelude to his conclusion that the plan must be invalidated: “Other problems
are evident in Seattle’s system, but there is no need to address them now.”134
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The Court’s judgment resulted in the invalidation of the school districts’
school assignment plans but Justice Kennedy’s cryptic opinion gave little sense
of what a viable plan would look like. Consider the options the Seattle district
had available to it immediately following the decision. It could develop more
precise racial categories, or perhaps it could use some of the race-conscious but
more obfuscatory means of integration that Justice Kennedy described as presumptively constitutional: “strategic site selection of new schools; drawing
attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty
in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race.”135 Whatever course the school district pursued, it would likely be
subject to additional litigation. That litigation or analogous litigation elsewhere
could again reach the Court, four, five, 10, 20 years down the line, with no
indication in advance of what unmentioned problems Justice Kennedy had with
the program.
Procedurally, the Court treated Parents Involved just as it would have treated
a case involving Jim Crow laws. It identified the constitutional infirmity and, in
effect, instructed the lower courts to enjoin the associated policy permanently.
The Court did not entertain any procedural or remedial mechanism for recognizing the good faith of the government actor or the complexity of the problem it
was trying, in good faith, to resolve. Comparative inquiry points the way to
alternative approaches to just this kind of problem.
Numerous apex and constitutional courts around the world—including
those in Canada, South Africa, Germany, India, and Israel—regularly announce
the provisional unconstitutionality of governmental laws and policies without
necessarily invalidating them. Consider the South African case of State v.
Ntuli,136 which Erin Delaney highlights in her study of judicial suspensions of
constitutional invalidity.137 The Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional a
statute governing the means by which convicted criminals could appeal their
convictions. But, anticipating the rise in appeals that the judgment would likely
occasion and the absence of an infrastructure for accommodating that increase,
the Court suspended its declaration of invalidity for nearly 18 months.138
The Ntuli case reflects one of two distinct kinds of problems that reasonably
should temper an apex or constitutional court’s instinct to order an all-or-nothing

135 Id., at 789.
136 1996 (1) SA 1207 (CC) (S. Afr.).
137 Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in Comparative Perspective, 66 DUKE
L.J. 1 (2016).
138 See Ntuli, supra note 136, paras 28–30.
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remedy. The first and most obvious, which Ntuli represents, is an insuperable
logistical or administrative problem that immediate constitutional invalidity
would create. The Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in the Manitoba Language
Act Reference provides an extreme example of this motivation for remedial flexibility. There, the Court held that the province had violated a constitutional
requirement that laws be published in both English and French. Rather than
immediately invalidate all provincial laws, and rather than permit fear of a
draconian remedy to influence its merits determination, the Court declared a
period of temporary validity for the length of time it would take for “translation,
re-enactment, printing and publishing” of existing provincial laws.139
Paradoxically, the second scenario calling for remedial flexibility is good
faith disagreement about the scope of rights. Courts sometimes have an instinct
towards obduracy in the face of high-profile rights conflict, as when the
Supreme Court suggested in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey that intense public disagreement counted as a reason not to overrule its
prior decision in Roe v. Wade.140 This instinct proceeds from the mistaken
premise that the Court has either the capacity or the obligation to firmly settle
such controversies for all time. Indeed, that statement by the Casey Court was
bluster. In departing from Roe’s doctrinal framework and in overruling multiple
other precedents favorable to abortion rights,141 the Court was responding precisely to the anti-abortion movement’s claims. The Court’s undue burden standard, which falls short of strict scrutiny, was an implicit recognition that it
should not treat anti-abortion laws the same way it treats laws infringing other
fundamental rights. Abortion rights opponents disagree, in good faith, about the
scope of women’s reproductive autonomy in the face of contrary rights claims
grounded in a certain conception of human life.
Other constitutional courts are more systematic in their flexible approach to
intense disagreement over the scope of rights. As Alex Stone Sweet has
observed, European judges tend to “avoid declaring either side a clear loser,
preferring, wherever possible, to issue partial victories, splitting the difference
between the disputants.”142 Rather than completely invalidate laws when
engaged in abstract review—which tend to be higher-stakes conflicts than individual complaints—they instead “remove those provisions considered to be
contaminated by unconstitutionality, allowing the rest of the law to be applied;

139 Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, 748 (Can.).
140 505 U.S. 833, 866–68 (1992).
141 See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); City of
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
142 STONE SWEET, supra note 66, at 142.
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or they tell the legislature how it must correct the law if it wishes to pursue a
given legislative reform.”143 Remedial options might include suspensions of
invalidity, severance of statutes, declaratory judgments that influence how
collateral laws or actions are understood or enforced, or information-forcing
devices such as disclosure requirements.
Consider another example from Canada. A group of sex workers challenged
a criminal prohibition on brothels on the ground, in part, that it violated their
right to security of the person, guaranteed in section 7 of the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, without sufficient justification.144 The Court agreed with the
plaintiffs, but it suspended the invalidity of the provision for 1 year to permit
Parliament to revise the law to respond to the identified constitutional problem.
The Court explained its reasoning thus:
[I]mmediate invalidity would leave prostitution totally unregulated while Parliament grapples with the complex and sensitive problem of how to deal with it. How prostitution is
regulated is a matter of great public concern, and few countries leave it entirely unregulated. Whether immediate invalidity would pose a danger to the public or imperil the rule
of law … may be subject to debate. However, it is clear that moving abruptly from a
situation where prostitution is regulated to a situation where it is entirely unregulated
would be a matter of great concern to many Canadians.145

It is fair to say that the Court’s reason for suspending invalidity was not
administrative necessity but rather a recognition that Parliament was dealing
with a “complex and sensitive” problem that is “a matter of great public concern.” The problem of racial balkanization that the Seattle and Louisville school
districts were attempting to address in Parents Involved was no less complex,
sensitive, or of concern to the American public.
As Delaney has noted, this kind of flexibility can meet the concerns of those
who fear the consequences of the merits ruling in much the same way that
justiciability doctrine is sometimes used in the United States and elsewhere as a
means of constitutional avoidance.146 The major difference is that engaging in
this kind of back-end remedial mitigation rather than the sorts of passive virtues
memorably advocated by Alexander Bickel transparently and indeed coercively
alerts political actors to constitutional problems. It does so in a way that
preserves their prerogative to address those problems in the first instance,
which itself is of constitutional dimension.
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The relationship between remedial flexibility and recognition of second and
third generation rights is well-known and abundantly theorized.147 The suggestion here is that the need for relatively weak remedies is not categorically limited
to positive rights, economic and social rights, or rights implicating horizontal
effects. Rather, weaker remedies are integral to enforcement of all marginal
rights, insofar as the motivation is not necessarily administrative or fiscal but
the existence of reasonable disagreement in itself.
As with proportionality and Lochner, an aversive example is relevant to any
discussion of the Court’s remedial posture in high-stakes cases. The U.S.
Supreme Court’s most celebrated decision, Brown v. Board of Education, was
enforced through a famously weak remedial order. Rather than behave like a
common law court and order that the plaintiffs in Brown and its consolidated
cases be admitted to school in a race-neutral fashion, the Court behaved like a
court of equity and left space for school authorities to proceed “with all deliberate speed” in light of the administrative and infrastructural burden of integrating public schools that had long been racially segregated.148
The Brown II Court’s effort to be flexible in just the way this article advocates
has exposed it to unrelenting criticism. The implementation of Brown was met
with massive resistance by southern politicians and residents, and eventually
the Court itself abandoned the integration project with a series of cases in the
1970s that most prominently included Milliken v. Bradley.149 Much of the conventional constitutional wisdom understands “‘all deliberate speed’ as little
more than ‘a soft euphemism for delay.’”150
It is a mistake, however, to pin failures in the school desegregation battles
on the Brown II remedial standard. First, it is arguable that Brown’s contemporaneous weak remedy was necessary to the strong right it established.
Second, the school desegregation movement lost momentum because of political
opposition to increasingly coercive remedies, such as busing, that were being
ordered by courts rather than devised by local officials. The substantive and
remedial mechanisms this article contemplates are precisely designed to invite
political actors into a conversation about the way forward in the face of a rights
violation.

147 See MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS (2009); KATHARINE G. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS (2012).
148 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1955).
149 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
150 Jim Chen, With All Deliberate Speed: Brown II and Desegregation’s Children, 24 L. &
INEQUALITY 1, 4 (2006) (quoting Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. Of Educ., 396 U.S. 1218,
1219 (1969) (Black, Circuit Justice)).
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Indeed, the Court’s categorical instincts on rights arguably played an important role in the ultimate failure of the Court to continue to engineer nationwide
school integration. While the Court remained unanimous in its cases seeking to
enforce integration in southern school districts, most recently in its 1973 decision
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,151 it divided sharply over
desegregation orders in northern districts. The problem is that northern districts
could not be shown to have engaged in systematic de jure or intentional
discrimination and yet many had levels of racial segregation that matched or
exceeded many southern school districts. In the first case to reach the Court from
a northern school district, Keyes v. School District No. 1,152 the Court confronted a
district, Denver, with no evidence of intentional districtwide segregation but
with demonstrated segregation efforts in a single portion of the city. The Court
held that a finding of intentional discrimination in a significant portion of the
city shifted the burden to the city to show that segregation in particular schools
was not racially motivated.153
The problem is that the Keyes decision perpetuated the view that the de jurede facto distinction should be treated as an on-off switch, not unlike the tiers of
scrutiny analysis. A finding of de facto segregation means that no rights have
been violated and relieves the state of any and all corrective obligations,
whereas a finding of de jure segregation means a constitutional violation of
the highest order, one that authorizes courts to order states to take racially
sensitive measures that the states are constitutionally forbidden from taking
voluntarily.
Justice Powell, who blessed tiered review in Rodriguez, condemned its
analog in Keyes, decided in the same Term. Justice Powell argued in his concurring opinion (and behind the scenes) that the Court should abandon the de
jure-de facto distinction and instead subject every school district to a test of
racial equality—in effects rather than intent—with respect to every significant
aspect of the educational process.154 Justice Brennan, who wrote the Keyes
majority opinion, offered to jettison the distinction so long as Justice Powell
was willing to impose an affirmative desegregation obligation, including busing,
on northern and western school systems.155 Powell refused.156 To the ears of
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Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, who joined the Keyes majority opinion,
Powell’s alternative no doubt sounded like “separate but equal” all over again.
But Justice Powell recognized that the problem of school segregation caused by
discriminatory housing patterns is too complex for a court to address through
the blunt instruments of Brown. Adopting Justice Powell’s suggestion would, in
effect, have subjected all of the nation’s schools to a proportionality regime with
respect to racial equality.
As with proportionality and as with drawing on greater investigative
resources to make factual findings, there are potential harms associated with a
court’s remedial flexibility. A timid attitude towards rights enforcement can have
expressive effects that ultimately diminish rather than enhance the power of the
court.157 In more practical terms, politicians and executive officials who do not
face strong remedies are more likely to drag their feet. But it is important to be
clear-eyed about the alternative. As noted, a limited remedial menu predictably
leads judges to “underenforce” rights based on slippery slope rather than substantive arguments.158 The choice between these dangers will depend greatly on
the nature of the rights culture and the constitutional court’s place within it.

Conclusion
The U.S. Supreme Court is the world’s oldest constitutional court. With age
comes not just wisdom but obstinance. The American model of rights adjudication maps procedural instincts developed in the context of private law litigation
between individuals onto disputes that set the terms of the Constitution for the
entire nation. While younger courts around the world have created institutional
mechanisms to better adapt to this lawmaking function, the U.S. Court has
barely budged. The result is not rights absolutism, which is how the U.S.
approach is sometimes described, but rights emasculation, as the pressure of
substantive and remedial inflexibility prevents the Court from sensitive adjudication in cases that generate reasonable disagreement about the scope of rights.
I have argued that the Court must adopt proportionality analysis, must
equip itself better to receive and adjudicate legislative facts, and must adopt
more flexible remedies if it is to engage sensibly with modern rights claims.
157 See Charles L. Black, Jr., Mr. Justice Black, The Supreme Court, and the Bill of Rights,
HARPER’S, Feb. 1961, at 63, 66; Robert Leckey, The Limits of Remedial Discretion, 14 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 584 (2016).
158 See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1217–18 (1978).
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Other courts have adopted these methods with varying degrees of success, but
the argument does not depend on the strength of this comparison. To the degree
these innovations are incompatible with the American judicial system, the
American judicial system is incompatible with modern rights. U.S. courts will
either continue to engage in deliberate obfuscation in order to grow constitutional law, or they will reject novel or contested rights conceptions simply for
being novel or contested. There is no middle ground.
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